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Introduction
On 20 December 2013, Mogadishu’s Somali 
Police Force (SPF) celebrated the seventieth 
anniversary of the founding of its namesake 
(Keydmedia 2013). Originally established 
in 1943 as the Police Corps of Somalia, it 
changed its name to the SPF in 1960 when 
it joined with the British Somaliland Scouts 
to form the national force of the newly 
independent Somalia. Fragmenting in 1991 
when former president Siad Barre fled and 
two decades of civil war began, today’s SPF 
re-emerged in the late 2000s. It celebrated 
its anniversary for the first time in Decem-
ber 2013. 
Unlike its predecessor, the current SPF 
is confined to Mogadishu, a coastal city of 
some three million inhabitants. Furthermore, 
its claim to be the successor of the post-
independence force rests primarily on the 
international support and protection that it 
and Mogadishu’s government receive. Even 
so, the public police forces operating in 
Somalia’s other main administrative regions — 
Somaliland in the north-west and Puntland in 
the north-east — accept the SPF’s existence and 
inheritance. This suggests that, while political 
settlements and international resources play 
a significant role in Somali police develop-
ment, so do memories of policing in the 30 
years between independence and the wars of 
the 1990s. This article uses Somalia’s experi-
ence to consider the relationship between 
past and present in areas of limited statehood 
with low literacy rates, and what this tells us 
about the role of institutional memory in the 
absence of documentation. 
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Police reform is thought to require a police force to break with its past. This is 
notably so in the aftermath of conflict or regime change. In practice, however, 
most police forces are selectively reconstituted, and their development is influ-
enced as much by legacy issues as by international standards filtered through local 
norms. This article uses the experience of Somalia’s three regional police forces 
to reconsider the relationship between past and present projects to build police 
authority and capacity, and what this says about institutional memory in the 
absence of documentation. In Somalia, as in other clan or tribal-based societies, 
police development is influenced by a blend of security levels, political imperatives, 
pragmatism, international resources and memories of past practices, with group 
experience playing a more significant role than institutional memory. The only 
identifiable general principle is the need for political settlements and tactical flex-
ibility – that is, for stability.
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These issues deserve attention because 
the principles on which a police is best 
reconstructed or reformed and its author-
ity established are unclear. Police culture is 
notoriously resistant to change (Hills 2012) 
yet police development continues to be 
understood as a reform project designed to 
break with the past (e.g. Bayley 2006; OECD 
DAC 2007; Downie 2013). This is understand-
able in that the brutal or corrupt policing 
found in many fragile environments is often 
cited as a cause of instability and conflict. 
Nevertheless, most development projects aim 
for fundamental change, with police reform 
regarded as a means for social engineering. 
Take, for example, the ambitious and future-
oriented goals of the UNDP’s civilian police 
project for Somalia, which is one of the poor-
est and most fragmented countries in the 
world. Established in 2002 as part of a Rule 
of Law and Security in Somalia (ROLS) pro-
gramme, with an annual budget of US$ 20 
million in 2012, the project focuses on pro-
viding a professional civilian police service. 
It aims to meet the needs and expectations 
of all Somalis, with a special emphasis on 
inclusive and accountable policing. This will 
enable Somalia to ‘make progress towards 
peace and the Millennium Development 
Goals through equitable economic develop-
ment’ (UNSAS 2010). 
Police development projects also assume 
that the officers concerned depend on a 
police institution for support, opportunity 
and knowledge. It is thought that police as 
a group share an institutional memory; i.e. 
that an identifiable set of facts, concepts, 
experiences and knowledge exists. But what 
happens to the organisation and activity of 
policing when the institutions, processes, 
influences and officers on which it is seem-
ingly predicated for existence fragment, and 
stay fragmented for 20 years? Somalia rep-
resents a textbook case in which to explore 
these issues. 
Admittedly, Somalia’s experience is 
extreme, and the lessons it offers may not 
transfer to other clan or tribal-based societies, 
such as Yemen or Afghanistan, let alone to 
other states like Guinea-Bissau that are usu-
ally classified as failed. Yet it offers insights 
into the interplay between memories of 
policing and the experiences and skills that 
shape the re-emergence of police in the after-
math of conflict. Two are noteworthy. First, it 
suggests that police development is an adap-
tive process reflecting a mix of contingen-
cies, political imperatives, pragmatism and 
functional knowledge, and that group and 
individual memories play a key part in this. 
Indeed, this is markedly so in societies, such 
as Somalia’s, that value genealogy and group 
relationships. It could even be that clan mem-
ory, which transcends the individual, plays a 
role similar to institutional memory.1 Second, 
re-emergent forces such as the SPF are best 
understood as reflecting layers of functional 
and political knowledge and experience. 
‘Layers’ is used in a descriptive, rather than 
a scientific manner, but it conveys the way 
in which police typically integrate technical 
experience and local norms and practices 
into a meaningful framework.
The discussion that follows is divided 
into three sections. The first offers an over-
view of Somalia’s three public police forces 
before analysing their development in terms 
of a layered knowledge base, rather than an 
institutional memory. The second section 
identifies security and stability as critical var-
iables influencing the re-emergence of police 
forces, with tactical flexibility the only iden-
tifiable general principle. The third section 
concludes that policing is selectively recon-
stituted, rather than fundamentally restruc-
tured or reformed. In Somalia, as elsewhere, 
the success or failure of police development 
projects is determined by the political skill 
with which local realities, contingencies and 
international expectations are balanced. 
Layering Knowledge
Somalia is commonly regarded as the para-
digmatic failed state (Fund for Peace 2013) 
yet it is actually managed by a variety of 
security and administrative entities and 
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authorities. These are linked ethnically and 
economically but have different levels of 
stability and styles of governance. (Govern-
ance here refers to the rules, processes and 
interactions through which decisions are 
made and authority exercised). The interna-
tional agenda for Somalia focuses on Moga-
dishu as the capital of a unified state, but in 
practice inter-governmental organisations 
(IGOs), bilaterals and donors divide Somalia 
into three main administrative areas: Somali-
land, Puntland and Mogadishu (see UNDFS 
2011). South-Central Somalia is best catego-
rised as a remainder rather than an entity or 
region; its cross-hatching of clans obstructs 
the development of an entity with a common 
governance structure. This division reflects 
that Somaliland declared itself an inde-
pendent republic in 1991, Puntland claimed 
autonomy in 1998, while the international 
community supports a government confined 
to Mogadishu. And each of the three main 
entities has a distinct public police force.2 
The nature of Somalia’s complex and 
dynamic environment means that progress 
in police development depends on political 
settlements, which require relative stabil-
ity. This has been a positive experience in 
Somaliland where, in 2011, the director gen-
eral of the Ministry of the Interior described 
security and stability as the country’s most 
significant achievement (Interview, Director 
General, Hargeisa, 7 September 2011). The 
development of Puntland’s police has fol-
lowed political settlements, too, albeit to a 
lesser extent. But the process has been much 
less successful in Mogadishu. Somaliland’s 
police structure reflects the skill with which 
its power brokers have balanced political cal-
culations, clan relations and modern and tra-
ditional institutions (Harris and Foresti 2011; 
Renders 2013), whereas the SPF’s rudimen-
tary system reflects the precarious position of 
Mogadishu’s Federal Government of Somalia 
(FGS), on whose behalf it acts. Although 
the US formally recognised the FGS as the 
national government of Somalia in January 
2013 (the IMF did the same in April 2013 and 
the UK opened an embassy in May), the exist-
ence of the FGS and SPF actually depends on 
the presence of thousands of African Union 
troops and on financial and humanitarian 
support from the United Nations and donors 
such as Japan.
The Somali environment also means that 
officers in all three forces lack the appear-
ance and attributes commonly associated 
with police and police forces. Not all have 
uniforms, not all consider conventional 
forms of discipline and hierarchy (e.g. ranks) 
desirable or necessary, and the social accept-
ability and addictiveness of chewing qat, a 
mild narcotic, means that many stations are 
closed in the afternoon (Hills 2014: 97–98). 
Also, as classes at Somalia’s regional training 
schools emphasise (Personal observations, 
Mandera, September 2011; private com-
munications, international adviser, August 
2011), many general-duties officers are unfit, 
elderly, illiterate or unable to understand the 
basic principles of international-style polic-
ing. Yet, this does not mean that they are not 
police or that ‘a police force in the Western 
sense is...an alien institution’ (Murphy 2011: 
156; for Western policing see Manning 
2011). Regardless of their appearance, or 
ability to read or provide order, Somalia’s 
forces share occupational commonalities 
with police in other regions, are linked to 
international policing networks,3 are aware 
of the internationally recognised policing 
that Somalia experienced during independ-
ence, and are in some cases (primarily in 
Somaliland) consciously developing the 
complex of practices, procedures and norms 
required for the capacity-building through 
which institution-building is thought to 
emerge and be expressed. 
In other words, Somali officers are police, 
and they belong to police forces even if those 
forces have little in common with those 
described by, for example, Deflem, for whom 
‘police bureaucracies are hierarchically-
ordered with a clear chain of command...
and policework follows set rules and proce-
dures...’ (Deflem 2000: 744; Deflem 2002: 
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18). More importantly, all three forces have 
enough in common with police elsewhere 
in the world to offer a baseline for exploring 
the ways in which police authority is consti-
tuted and institutional memory developed 
in societies subject to chronic insecurity 
and high levels of illiteracy. Indeed, Somalia 
is a particularly valuable case with which 
to discuss these issues because its three 
forces cover a policing spectrum that spans 
an under-resourced SPF that is expected to 
provide civilian policing in the middle of an 
insurgency and humanitarian emergencies, 
Somaliland’s relatively developed system, 
and Puntland’s emergent force which is posi-
tioned between the two.
Somalia’s police forces are also surprisingly 
conventional. They are structured on lines 
common throughout Africa and are famil-
iar with international practices and proce-
dures even as they filter them through local 
interests and dispositions. Admittedly, this 
assessment conflates diametrically opposed 
meanings of ‘conventional’ (of police rely-
ing on local practices while complying with 
Western structures), but it reflects the ways 
in which Somali police, like police around the 
world, respond to imported models or new 
practices in an adaptive manner, integrating 
aspects of international understanding with 
local realities and personal or group experi-
ence. It reflects the ways in which officers 
adjust to local realities (Menkhaus 2006) and 
international pressures (Höehne 2009: 253). 
The best way to understand this situation is 
to see it as layers of knowledge, with the lay-
ers consisting of legacy issues, international 
influence, and local norms and practices. 
Legacy issues
Since approximately 2008, when the UNDP 
began keeping records of officers receiv-
ing training, international notions such as 
rights-based policing and police-community 
partnerships have been promoted as a means 
to mitigate Somali policing’s flaws. However, 
while Somali policing is typically minimal, 
predatory or oriented towards counter-
insurgency and counter-terrorism, many 
older Somalis know something about the 
history of Somali policing in the decade after 
independence in 1960. This was when the 
SPF was created as a civilian police capable 
of counter-balancing the Soviet-supported 
army (Barre had been the Somali National 
Police’s commissioner during the last decade 
of pre-independence). Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that some of the officers operating 
during those years felt a professional pride in 
their job, displaying willingness and self-reli-
ance. In 1959, for instance, on discovering 
that only three of the 30 officers in a small 
town in today’s Puntland were literate, a sen-
ior officer brought in teachers to make the 
remaining 27 literate in Italian (Interview, 
NGO official, Garowe, 14 September 2011). 
More importantly, many of today’s officers 
and officials are conscious of both Somalia’s 
internationally respected policing during 
the 1960s (Perito 2002: 30) and their need 
to avoid the repressive practices of the Barre 
era of the 1970s and 80s, which many asso-
ciate with centralised policing. Indeed, con-
versations with senior officers suggest that 
officers and officials in all three forces build 
on memories of independent Somalia’s 30 
years of national policing even as they reject 
Barre’s brutality. Rather than trying to shed 
its colonial-era identity, Somaliland officers 
and officials say the legacy is a useful refer-
ence point (Personal conversations, Hargeisa, 
7 September 2011).4 This is understandable 
given that the police commissioner (chief 
officer) in post in Somaliland in the autumn 
of 2011 enlisted in 1942, and the comman-
dant of Somaliland’s police training academy 
at Mandera joined in 1958. There is no wel-
fare provision so officers have no incentive 
to retire.
The extent to which an identifiable insti-
tutional memory developed during this 
period is debatable. On the one hand, the 
SPF’s institutional base was initially strong. 
It was organised into northern and southern 
group commands, divisional commands (cor-
responding to the districts that existed then), 
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station commands and police posts, with 
regional governors and district commission-
ers commanding regional and district police 
elements. By the mid 1970s, its approximately 
15,000 officers (which included 6,000 from 
a clan-based militia called the Daraawishta) 
were divided into 18 regional districts, each 
with about 90 stations and 100 posts in 
smaller towns. Its officers carried out patrols, 
traffic duties, criminal investigation, as well 
as intelligence and counter-insurgency while 
the Daraawishta and a riot group (Birmadka 
Booliska) acted as elite mobile units capa-
ble of stopping clan conflict in remote areas 
and along the frontier.5 It was overseen by 
the Ministry of Interior until 1976, at which 
point it came under the control of the presi-
dential adviser on security affairs. 
On the other hand, Somalia operated under 
a civil administration for only nine years 
(Barre came to power in 1969’s coup d’état), 
and kinship and customary law (Xeer) were 
always more important organising principles 
for Somalia’s pastoral-based society than for-
mal institutions. Also, Barre distrusted and 
emasculated institutions such as the SPF, 
leaving only the National Security Service in 
a position of influence. Furthermore, by the 
late 1980s, his authority was confined to the 
main towns where police played a minimal 
role; the riots of 1989 were policed by troops 
with machine guns who cleared the streets 
by shooting anything that moved. 
Somalia has not experienced central polic-
ing since 1991, though precisely what hap-
pened to the SPF’s officers during the 1990s 
is unclear (for the early 1990s see Ganzglass 
1996; Thomas and Spataro 1998; Perito 
2002). Anecdotal evidence suggests that a 
handful of individuals offered a minimal and 
localised police presence, but most melted 
into their neighbourhoods and clan group-
ings. The practices and values associated with 
bureaucratic institutions were forgotten. As 
45-year-old Mohammed Haroum (an SPF 
traffic policeman who had resumed his job 
after a two-decade break) said in 2012: ‘These 
days ... people do not know what a drivers’ 
licence is. They have never seen one. No-one 
has even heard of insurance ... We are learn-
ing to be normal again’ (BBC 2012; Compare 
Kentucky.com 2014). 
In practice, the foundation on which the 
new normalcy is built owes more to relative 
stability, clan calculations, tactical flexibility, 
pragmatism and memories of what is needed 
for international recognition than to inter-
national policing models and practices. And 
memories of the internationally-respected 
policing Somalia experienced during the 
1960s matter because they influence Somali 
ideas about police today. Lund’s observation 
that state-based notions and concepts such 
as stateness — or, in this case, police — are 
best understood as an amalgamation of pub-
lic authority by local institutions ‘conjugated 
with the idea of the state’ is indicative (Lund 
2006: 685).
International influence 
While individuals have different experiences 
of life during the wars of the 1990s and the 
entities have differing visions of Somalia, 
there is a consensus on what police should 
look like that is reinforced by officers in all 
three forces having a history of international 
contact. The original SPF received equipment 
or training from, amongst others, China, 
Egypt, the German Democratic Republic, 
Italy, Sudan, West Germany, the UK and the 
USA. Additionally, Barre’s advocacy of Marx-
ism embedded certain Soviet approaches, 
and anecdotal evidence suggests that this 
still influences the attitudes of some senior 
officials.6 
Training projects supported or provided 
by IGOs such as the UNDP, the UN Political 
Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the African 
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) add 
another layer to Somali policing knowledge, 
and, while training projects rarely affect the 
way officers conduct their everyday business, 
they offer individuals a window onto inter-
national ideals and modern or ‘professional’ 
skills. Thus, the UNDP’s civil policing project 
in Somaliland provides a comprehensive 
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package of activities that includes not only 
basic recruit training and specialist training 
in criminal investigation, critical incident 
management and headquarters functions 
(such as financial management and logis-
tics), but also offers courses in rights-based 
partnership policing, the Cairo Declaration 
on Islam and Human Rights, and the 
Somaliland police charter and constitution. 
Between October 2010 and 2011, 2,400 offic-
ers were trained at Mandera, while other 
international activities included the visit to 
Mogadishu in 2009 of an AMISOM police 
team with a remit to train, mentor and advise 
the SPF, mid-level training courses by the 
Uganda Police Force, and cadet courses held 
in Uganda and Ethiopia. In November 2010, 
UNPOS, funded by Japan and in partner-
ship with the AMISOM civilian police unit, 
began a three-month basic training course 
in Djibouti for 501 new SPF officers based 
on a curriculum developed by the UNDP and 
approved by UNPOS, AMISOM and donors. 
More recently, a delegation from the SPF and 
AMISOM went to Sierra Leone for a study 
visit. Sierra Leone having been identified as 
a success story that Somalia could learn from 
(Hiraan Online 2013). 
Local norms and practices
Of the three elements identified here, local 
norms and practices is the most influential 
on every-day policing and policework. This 
is because officers are recruited from, and 
represent, elements of Somali society. They 
must, for example, integrate traditional 
Somali approaches into their functional 
knowledge, because unlike the situation 
in Liberia for example, the social fabric did 
not collapse after 1991. Somalis look first 
to customary justice and local or traditional 
non-state actors such as elders or Shari’a, 
rather than to police; officers typically inter-
vene only when requested by elders imple-
menting customary law.7 Also, officers (and 
general-duties officers in particular) engage 
with local elders, mayors and district secu-
rity committees about issues such as land 
or water rights, and mayors in towns such 
as Puntland’s Bossaso, Galkayo and Garowe 
say that land and water rights are the biggest 
issue they hear about on daily basis. They also 
settle many cases without recourse to either 
elders or courts, as when the five female 
officers attached to Hargeisa’s women and 
children’s desk settle informally nine or 10 
of the 10–15 cases they receive each month 
(most involve children). In many cases, offic-
ers enlist the support of traditional authori-
ties, but they also use their discretion to 
deal with minor incidents such as theft from 
market stalls (Interview, five female officers, 
Hargeisa, 6 September 2011). 
The role of discretion in policing has long 
been acknowledged (Kelling 1999). However, 
Somali policing lacks the hierarchical and 
bureaucratic-based organization that inter-
national policing models use to offset discre-
tion. Additionally, negotiation and tactical 
flexibility are underpinned by the threat of 
political or physical violence, for these are 
strong themes in Somali policing, just as they 
are in Somali society. This is particularly true 
of SPF officers who may be aware of interna-
tional policing practices, but must repeat-
edly negotiate between the contradictory 
demands of donors’ insistence on civilian 
policing and the federal government’s need 
for counter-insurgency operations. They 
must also negotiate with a range of alterna-
tive policing providers, for security and jus-
tice are provided by militia and clan groups 
loyal to factional leaders, as well as by busi-
ness men and Shari’a courts. Consequently, 
combinations of formal and informal secu-
rity providers are common. In July 2011, for 
example, security in Mogadishu’s Dharkenlay 
district improved significantly as a result 
of the combined efforts of an experienced 
cross-clan militia made up of officers who 
had served under Barre (the Hillac brigade), 
youth militias (madani), a Sufi militia (Ahlu-
Sunna Wal-Jama, which is theoretically 
aligned to the government but actually oper-
ates autonomously) and the district’s police 
(PAC July 2011). 
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As this suggests, local norms and prac-
tices play a critical role in policing. Somalia 
is the site of multiple conflicts over terri-
tory, trade monopolies, political power and 
scarce resources, all of which are fought by 
people with little if any interest in institu-
tions or institutional development. Policing 
is a commodity and a business opportunity, 
rather than a community service, and is part 
of the same political dynamics as clans, con-
flict, entrepreneurialism and fragmentation 
(Interviews, officials, Nairobi, September 
2011). And Somalis are susceptible to such 
pressures because clan-based commitments 
and obligations are the only guarantees most 
can rely on; security, protection, opportuni-
ties for poverty reduction — all depend on 
clan/group relationships, rather than on gov-
ernmental directives or institutions (Luling 
2006; Gundel 2009; Danish Immigration 
Service 2013). 
Legacy issues, international support and 
local norms and practices have in this way 
provided Somali officers with a layered 
knowledge base that does not rely on insti-
tutional memory. Nevertheless, institutional 
development is now a fact. Significantly, 
in each police force it depends on political 
settlements, which in turn require relative 
security and stability. International advisers 
may regard Puntland’s police as being tech-
nically and institutionally five years behind 
Somaliland’s (Puntland was a backwater 
during Barre’s era), but technical and insti-
tutional development has been possible in 
both because their forces were established 
after political settlements were agreed; their 
police are seen as legitimate elements in 
their government’s control apparatus. But 
this is not the case in Mogadishu where the 
SPF are little more than militiamen in uni-
forms and the credibility of the government 
on whose behalf it claims to act is limited 
(Financial Times 2014). Hence the signifi-
cance of the SPF’s name and claimed line-
age — and its utility as a tool for addressing 
the key contextual issue affecting institu-
tional development in fragile states: security 
levels. Specifically, the insecurity and insta-
bility Mogadishu has experienced since 1991 
allows consideration of the issue at the heart 
of this article: the significance for police 
development of institutional memory in the 
absence of written documentation. 
A Re-emergent Force
Ironically, it is the SPF which best illustrates 
what happens to the organization and activ-
ity of policing when the institutions, pro-
cesses and international influences, on which 
it is seemingly predicated for existence and 
opportunity, fragment — and remain frag-
mented for 20 years. Indeed, the SPF’s experi-
ence adds a new dimension to police studies 
because a small number of former officers 
retained personal memories of policing and 
policeness even after formal state author-
ity collapsed and policing was taken over by 
militia groups, warlords, traditional elders, 
Shari’a courts, and businessmen. Explain-
ing this — and identifying its analytical and 
empirical implications — is, however, compli-
cated by a lack of hard evidence. Not only is 
there minimal documentation available from 
Somali sources, but also there is little between 
the articles and reports written by advisers in 
the early 1990s (Ganzglass 1996; Oakley et al. 
1998) and the records created by the UNDP’s 
civilian policing project since 2008 — and 
record keeping remains challenging even for 
the purpose of paying today’s stipends. 
What currently exists reflects a combina-
tion of relative security and stability, and the 
influence of international advice and stand-
ards filtered through local norms and imper-
atives, rather than institutional records; the 
occurrence books recording events in sta-
tions are rarely kept up-to-date (Personal 
communications, Nairobi, September 2011). 
It also suggests that despite several decades 
of conflict, memories of the SPF as a cen-
tralised command organisation has helped 
to ensure that a baseline for public policing 
exists. Mogadishu remains a dangerously 
insecure city but the speed with which the 
SPF has developed over the last four or five 
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years suggests that the force has re-emerged, 
rather than been created. 
Coping with insecurity
In June 2013, the Islamist insurgent group al-
Shabaab attacked a UN compound just out-
side Mogadishu’s airport where thousands 
of African Union troops are based, killing 
15, and in August 2013, Médecins Sans Fron-
tières (MSF) pulled out of Somalia because 
the threat of violence had become intoler-
able: ‘We have reached our limit’ (Al Jazeera 
2013). Elsewhere, suicide bombings, assas-
sinations, mines, IEDs, stray bullets and hit-
and-run attacks erode traditional practices 
and values. Insecurity is fuelled by fears that 
veiled women bus-passengers and students 
with rucksacks could be suicide bombers, 
and is exacerbated by clan and community 
tensions, freelance militias, and disputes 
about land, livestock and water (especially in 
IDP camps).8 There are no reliable statistics 
covering crime and violence in the city, but 
Somalia’s dozens of (almost real-time) news 
services speak of high rates of theft, forced 
detention, sexual violence and gun-related 
murders (compare OCVP 2011: 2). 
Unsurprisingly, many Somalis see such 
crimes as components of broader conflict 
dynamics, rather than as individual events 
(OCVP 2011: 21). Somalia receives weapons 
from Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti, Ukraine, 
Libya, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea and the USA, and 
it is thought that more high-powered weap-
ons are in circulation now than in the 2000s. 
This, combined with memories of Barre’s 
brutal policing, meddling by frontline states 
such as Ethiopia, and the FGS’s weakness, 
destroys respect for state institutions. Somali 
politicians and power brokers think in terms 
of individual or clan interests, government 
authorities are unresponsive to people’s 
needs, and social factors play out in the politi-
cal sphere (OCVP 2011: 36). It makes for high 
levels of suspicion (Somalia Report 2012a), 
which undermines even minimal forms of 
institutions and governance. It also makes 
for hopelessness. Mogadishu is currently 
experiencing a building boom (Yahoo News 
2013), but many share the bleak outlook of 
participants in OCVP focus groups in 2011. 
Participants spoke of a ‘lack of faith in the 
ability of the community (let alone the state) 
to protect individuals, a sense of injustice, 
trauma, and general hopelessness for the 
future’ while youth focus groups identified 
‘fear of the unknown’ as a prompt for joining 
armed groups (OCVP 2011: 35).
Despite this (or perhaps because of it), 
a range of resources for coping with the 
consequences of insecurity and social frag-
mentation exists, with the most success-
ful predicated on local ties, knowledge and 
informal responses (compare Renders 2012). 
This approach is reinforced by Somalis pri-
oritising reconciliation and reparation over 
retribution and punishment, and preferring 
informal alternatives to formal sentencing 
and detention facilities. Customary law is 
more powerful than formal institutions and 
even governments use elders to solve, man-
age and negotiate issues; government (secu-
lar) law, and its associated institutions, is the 
weakest of all. Co-operative arrangements 
exist, too, as when militias loyal to district 
commissioners ensure that people return-
ing to their neighbourhoods register at a 
police station, while police accommodate 
civil society initiatives providing surveillance 
and reporting: ‘they tell us’. They must also 
accommodate militia operating under agree-
ments with the government and AMISOM. In 
other words, police development cannot be 
discussed in isolation from broader trends. 
Tactical flexibility
The long-term consequences of fragmenta-
tion for the police’s state-based authority 
are more limited than international policing 
models suggest. It is undeniable that many 
SPF officers are little more than militiamen 
in police uniforms, yet this does not mean 
that they are not police any more than being 
former rebels precludes South Sudanese 
from being policemen.9 Indeed, Mogadishu’s 
environment makes this understandable. 
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The SPF’s technical capacity has declined, 
and its operating procedures and disci-
pline are minimal, but memories of how 
policing was organised before 1991 have 
evidently been influential. It managed to 
keep between four and six stations open 
throughout the war, and by 2011 had a 
(semi-functioning) headquarters and train-
ing academy. Organised conventionally in 
directorates of operations, finance, training, 
Criminal Investigation Department (CID), 
and administration, its activities range from 
counter-insurgency to traffic management 
and criminal investigation. Dharkeynley dis-
trict may be managed by militia but even in 
April 2011 there were 30 uniformed officers 
present on the streets and in local markets 
(PAC April 2011). 
It is true that this picture owes much to 
international resources, which are intended 
to reinforce the appearance of the SPF as an 
institution. For example, most of the city’s 
officers are dressed in light blue shirts and 
dark blue trousers or in military-style light 
brown (colour is based mainly on where the 
officers are trained) even if their pay is delayed 
and they lack weaponry, handcuffs, batons 
and the pick-up trucks needed for mobility. 
Similarly, the SPF’s line ministry may be lit-
tle more than an inexperienced newcomer in 
an empty office, but approximately 5,300 of 
its estimated 6,000 ‘police-soldiers’ (the term 
used by the city’s police oversight body, the 
Police Advisory Committee (PAC)) are given 
a three-month police training course by the 
UNDP before being sent out to Mogadishu’s 
operational police stations (the rest are 
trained in the region under bilateral agree-
ments between the FGS and its partners). 
Nevertheless, internationals can only exert 
influence when Somalis allow it (Hills 2014: 
97–98), so the situation seen in 2011, for 
example, indicates Somali views on what a 
police force should look like: officers should 
be conventionally organised, maintain a vis-
ible presence and provide area security. 
By mid-2011, after two decades of con-
flict, the FGS’s predecessor, the Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG), and its police 
controlled approximately 98 per cent of 
Mogadishu, which was divided into 16 dis-
tricts, each of which had a headquarters and 
four divisions (there is a station in each).10 In 
addition to stations at the airport (70 offic-
ers), port (94) and the CID (150), there were 
stations in Dharkenley (65 officers), Hamar 
Weyne (91), Hamar Jabab (250), Shangani 
(40), Waberi (72) and Wadajir (92) (PAC July 
2011). Dharkeynley, for instance, had 30 
uniformed officers at checkpoints and in 
markets, while officers in Wadajir manned 
a checkpoint on the district’s main road 
and patrolled the nearby market and main 
bus stations armed with AK47s, talking to 
local people in a ‘friendly’ manner (PAC 
April 2011). Reports by the PAC noted that 
in April 2011 security was tight at Wadajir 
station (several inmates had recently tried 
to escape), but hygiene in the cells was gen-
erally good, with water and electricity avail-
able, and inmates separated by sex, age and 
crime (unusual for Somalia). 
The range of activities typically undertaken 
by SPF officers can be seen from the PAC’s 
Monthly Report on the Activities of the Somali 
Police Force for July 2011. (It is consistent 
with that offered in 2013 by international 
assessments such as those provided by the 
Danish Immigration Service). Written pri-
marily for the UNDP/ROLS, and, therefore, 
arguably presenting an ideal picture, the PAC 
report notes that the SPF’s workload is organ-
ized around divisions and stations, and is 
based on information from street patrols and 
informants and on government directives or 
orders. Activities are divided into operations 
intended ‘to enhance community safety’ and 
‘street patrolling as part of wider counter ter-
rorism efforts’, but most relate to deterrence. 
Officers manned checkpoints, deployed at 
major intersections, and conducted random 
stop and search operations in an effort to 
increase the police’s presence. They tar-
geted individuals or small groups suspected 
of armed robbery, kidnapping and looting 
(the latter involved militiamen responsible 
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for providing night-time neighbourhood 
watches) though non-terrorist prosecutions 
were rare. No mass arrests were carried out 
in July but March had seen a major security 
operation involving 300 people charged with 
having unlawful weapons and violating secu-
rity rules (the use of mass arrests is noted in 
Danish Immigration Service 2013). 
The PAC’s July report emphasises the SPF’s 
role in counter-terrorism and/or counter-
insurgency, rather than civilian policing or 
formal governance. But this is appropriate 
given that the SPF is a faction in the con-
tinuing conflict in which its lightly-armed 
officers confront insurgents armed with 
heavy machine guns and light anti-aircraft 
artillery. Indeed, PAC members routinely 
refer to ‘policemen-soldiers’ targeting ‘sleep-
ing insurgents’, particularly among IDPs. 
It noted that Dharkenlay police had had a 
particularly difficult week, fighting youth 
militias (armed with hand grenades and 
handguns) suspected of being both armed 
robbers and covert insurgents, and arresting 
seven men (three of whom were military) 
who had set up illegal check points to extort 
money. The PAC’s members, like respondents 
to focus groups conducted by the Hargeisa-
based Observatory on Conflict and Violence 
Prevention (OCVP), were clear about the 
distinctions between police and military 
enforcement agencies, but were less con-
cerned by those between police and militia. 
And Mogadishu’s environment makes this 
understandable: policing is subject to shift-
ing loyalties, tactical fluidity and clan calcula-
tions, and a significant proportion of officers 
have close links to militia. Younger and fitter 
officers probably find the swarming tactics 
employed by militia and fighters (Kilcullen 
2013: 81–86) more attractive than the com-
munity-based policing promoted by donors. 
Whatever the case, the PAC report implies 
that Somali policing places a premium on 
flexible and pragmatic approaches that are 
at odds with international-style policing’s 
reliance on a formal and bureaucratic insti-
tution. Discretion is a feature of most police 
systems, but Somali officers are expected to 
align their practices to international stand-
ards while operating in a rule-based society 
characterized by the legal pluralism of for-
mal, customary and Shari’a law.11 This sug-
gests that Somali policing structures are, like 
Somali social structures, best understood as 
flexible social and political processes, with 
the emphasis on accommodation, inter-
pretation and knowledge based on a range 
of resources (compare Little 2003: 3), all of 
which is overhung by the threat of actual or 
potential violence. 
Conclusions
Surprisingly little is known about the ways 
in which the past and present interact to 
affect police development in areas of limited 
statehood. International police projects are 
designed to ensure that local forces break 
with their past whereas local realities help 
to ensure continuity. This is notably so in 
conservative clan-based societies where the 
absence of welfare arrangements means that 
there is no incentive for unsuitable offic-
ers to retire or reject the political economy 
they are part of. Tensions arise as the future-
oriented agenda of international reform 
projects collides with the more immediate 
expectations of local recipients, but the 
interface is rarely analysed. 
Somalia is a particularly interesting case in 
which to explore these issues because signifi-
cant number of its officers were members of 
the original SPF and are now, after 20 years 
of conflict and fragmentation, part of the 
re-emergent SPF or the new regional forces. 
Hard evidence is missing, but anecdotally, 
the experience of serving officers suggests 
that police development is influenced by a 
blend of variables. These include contingen-
cies, international resources, and political 
and/or entrepreneurial imperatives, all of 
which are superimposed on technical skills, 
experience and memories of past practices. 
The critical issue for IGOs and donors, there-
fore, concerns identifying the optimum bal-
ance — or tipping point — between past and 
present, and between locally and interna-
tionally acceptable norms and practices. 
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Taking this as its point of departure, this 
article offers five findings, which are also 
relevant for police reform in other clan or 
tribal-based countries:
First, police knowledge is layered. Personal 
experience of policing in the 1960s, an aver-
sion to Barre-era practices, a lack of formal 
education in the 1990s, or life as a militia-
man in the 2000s, combine with local norms 
and exposure to international approaches 
to provide Somali officers with a functional 
knowledge base that is more reliable than 
institutional memories or formal documen-
tation. This is reinforced by low literacy, 
respect for genealogy and the resilience com-
mon to many clan-based societies. 
Second, the Somali approach to polic-
ing is tactically flexible because officers 
operate in a rule-based society character-
ized by legal pluralism. In most countries 
policing is characterised by discretion and 
pragmatism, but Somali policing is, like 
Somali politics, particularly subject to shift-
ing loyalties, clan calculations and opaque 
decision-making; pragmatism and informal-
ity are more characteristic of its governance 
than routine or precedent. Officers protect 
what they value, manipulate what they can 
use and subvert approaches that offend the 
sensibilities of their conservative society. 
This tendency is reinforced by police reform 
attracting international resources, which 
make it a business opportunity for senior 
officers, as for politicians and businessmen. 
The real challenge for reformers is how to 
protect the institutional development some 
now associate with professional and mod-
ern policing from the predations of other 
officers and politicians.
Third, Somalia’s record shows that while 
institutional development (and technical pro-
gress) depends on political settlements based 
on an agreed set of rules, the re-emergence 
or restructuring of police forces is not con-
tingent on institutional structures or institu-
tional memories. Neither is it dependent on 
the existence of a formal criminal justice sys-
tem. Indeed, the last decade emphasises that 
minimal forms of policing are sustainable in 
the absence of formal government structures 
and institutions. 
Linked to this is a fourth point, which is 
that even token forms of institution build-
ing and technical development require the 
broader political-security environment to be 
relatively stable; formality is not required for 
police development, but relative security and 
stability are. Stability has allowed Somaliland 
to reconstruct a locally acceptable police that 
combines elements from the past with an eye 
to the future, whereas Mogadishu’s police 
and government are dependent on the politi-
cal agenda of external actors. Consequently, 
the SPF’s primary concern is to acquire the 
heavy weapons, vehicles, fuel and communi-
cations equipment it needs to survive today 
(Interview, SPF commissioner, Nairobi, 19 
September 2011. Compare Reuters 2014). 
Hence the prospects for police development 
are favourable in Somaliland and, to a lesser 
extent, Puntland, whereas the SPF’s future 
is uncertain. 
Lastly, police institutions may disintegrate 
and their documents may be destroyed, 
but police systems are remarkably resilient. 
Somalia’s experience offers insights into the 
nature of institutional memory in the absence 
of documentation and line ministries, and 
into what happens to the organisation and 
activity of policing when the institutions and 
processes on which it is seemingly depend-
ent for existence and opportunity fragment. 
But, general principles are hard to find 
because the re-emergence of police is driven 
by a blend of aspirations, opaque decision-
making, political settlements, memories and, 
critically, levels of security and stability. 
Notes
 1 A rich literature on Somali genealogy, cul-
ture and institutions has developed since 
the publication of I. M. Lewis’ seminal 
research (as in Pastoral Democracy), but 
none of it addresses the police’s role. For 
an overview see Höehne and Luling 2010. 
The analytical and empirical implications 
of this literature for the wider debates 
about police culture, institution building, 
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the rule of law and development have yet 
to be analysed systematically.
 2 The assessment of Somali police pre-
sented here is based on four week’s 
fieldwork conducted on behalf of the 
UNDP’s Rule of Law Programme in Soma-
lia (ROLS) in Puntland, Somaliland and 
Nairobi in September 2011, though the 
views are mine alone. It builds on per-
sonal observations and semi-structured 
interviews with approximately 30 Somali 
officers, supplemented by interviews 
with officials, elders, district safety com-
mittees, oversight committees and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) from 
across Somalia’s entities. These were 
cross-checked against interviews with 
international advisers and officials in 
Nairobi and the UK in 2012 and 2013. It 
was not possible to visit Mogadishu, but 
interviews were held in Nairobi with the 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG)’s 
police commissioner and director general 
of the Ministry of the Interior, as well as 
with past and current members of Moga-
dishu’s Police Advisory Committee (PAC), 
either in person or by telephone. 
 3 Somalia has been a member of INTERPOL 
since 1975, and was connected to INTER-
POL’s I-24/7 global police communica-
tions system in 2007. 
 4 Compare Puntland’s penal code, which is 
based on Anglo-Indian models. 
 5 In 2009, the Daraawishta consisted of 
2,750 personnel with 50 ‘technicals’ (an 
improvised gun truck based on a Toyota 
Hilux pick-up truck). One thousand were 
absorbed into the SPF (UNDP-SSA 2009: 
footnote 6). In 2011, the SPF had six 
technicals.
 6 Comments based on personal observa-
tions and conversations with international 
advisers in London, Nairobi, New York and 
Somalia in August-September 2011. 
 7 This means that officers in Somali-
land’s Hargeisa handle an average of 2.4 
reported crimes a year while those in Sahil 
Region (several hours drive to the north 
of Hargeisa) deal with 5.6 (Somaliland 
Police 2011: 3). Typically, cases of rape are 
referred to elders whereas armed robbery 
— which is regarded as less shameful and 
more serious — is referred to the police. 
This picture is consistent with the OECD’s 
estimate that in Africa approximately 
80% of security and justice provision is 
delivered by non-state providers (OECD 
DAC 2007: 11; Baker 2010).
 8 There were approximately 369,000 IDPs 
in Mogadishu in February 2013 (IRIN 
2013). 
 9 Compare the experience of Eritrea and 
South Sudan. In 1996, Eritrean officers 
dismissed the utility of rank on the basis 
that there had been none during the rev-
olution, though they admitted that war 
records influenced informal rankings and 
status (Personal communication, Bram-
shill, 19 April 1996). Ten years later, many 
of South Sudan’s new police were ex-
rebels. Some had a policing background 
but most did not, and those who did 
identified themselves as former rebels, 
rather than policemen (Personal commu-
nications, Pretoria, April 2007). 
 10 Thirteen stations are listed at www.
policesomaligov.net. The FGS succeeded 
the TFG in August 2012. 
 11 For the practical implications of this see 
Somalia Report 2012b. 
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